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Incarceration of criminals reduces crime through two main channels, deterrence and incapac-
itation. Because of a simultaneity between crime and incarceration–arrested criminals increase
the prison population–it is diﬃcult to measure these eﬀects. This paper estimates the incapaci-
tation eﬀect on crime using a unique quasi-natural experiment, namely the recurrent collective
pardoning between 1962 and 1995 of up to 35 percent of the Italian prison population. Since
these pardons are enacted on a national level, unlike in Levitt (1996), we can control for the
endogeneity of these laws that might be driven by criminals’ expectations: it is optimal to com-
mit crimes shortly before a collective pardon gets enacted. This eﬀect represents a deterrence
eﬀect, which, if not properly controlled for, would bias our IV estimates towards zero. The
incapacitation eﬀect is large and precisely estimated. The elasticity of crime with respect to
prison population ranges, depending on the type of crime, between 0 and 49 percent. These
numbers are increasing during our sample period, which suggests that habitual criminals are
now more likely to be subject to pardons than in the past. A beneﬁt-cost analysis suggests that
pardons, seen as a short term solution to prison overcrowding, are ineﬃcient.
Keywords: Crime, Pardon, Amnesty, Deterrence, Incapacitation
JEL classiﬁcation codes: K40, K42, H111 Introduction
This paper estimates the causal eﬀect of incapacitation on crime and breaks the simultaneity between
crime and incarceration using a unique quasi-natural experiment, namely Italy’s recurrent collective
pardoning of up to 35 percent of the prison population. Levitt (1996) uses overcrowding litigation
status to generate an exogenous variation in the US prison population, though only in rare occasions
do judges release prisoners to alleviate overcrowding. In the absence of actual releases the channel
through which litigation is supposed to aﬀect prison population in the short run is by inﬂuencing the
inﬂows of prisoners (i.e. laxer police, fewer oﬀenders sentenced to prison terms). Our instrument, on
the contrary, generates immediate changes in prison population.
Due to collective pardons and amnesties1 inmates with a residual sentence length of a given
number of years, usually 2 or 3, are released. The last collective pardon has been passed in July
2006, and in less than a month 22,000 inmates (more than one third of the whole prison population)
have been freed (DAP, 2006). This policy, seen as a short term solution to prison overcrowding,
generates a large variation in prison population.
Crime is likely to respond to collective pardons in three diﬀerent ways. Since pardons reduce
the expected sanction, everything else equal, we should expect crime to be higher in a society that
every once in a while makes use of them (long term deterrence eﬀect). Given the unavailability of
a counterfactual Italian society without pardons, this eﬀect is hard to estimate. Criminals might
also try to strategically time their criminal activity in order to minimize their expected sanction,
especially if the expected sentence length is similar to the usually pardoned sentence length (short
term deterrence eﬀect). For example, criminals might decrease their criminal activity immediately
after a pardon, simply because the next pardon is likely to occur only after several years. Not
controlling for this short term deterrence eﬀect would certainly downward bias the estimate of the
incapacitation eﬀect, which represents the last way collective pardons might aﬀect crime, that is by
releasing potential criminals. This eﬀect depends on the criminals’ physical presence on the criminal
scene. Most of the eﬀect is likely to be driven by recidivists, but there might also be some spillovers.
One one hand, the increased supply of criminals might inﬂuence the probability of crime detection,
and so attract new entrants on the criminal scene, while on the other hand released criminals might
1In Italian these policies are called “Indulto” and “Amnistia”
3drive some of the old criminals out of the market (Freeman, 1999).
To evaluate how pardons aﬀect crime it is also necessary to realize that they clearly are endoge-
nous: increased crime rates may lead, if no new prisons are build, to prison overcrowding, which may
lead to a collective release. A ﬁrst way we deal with this endogeneity is to ﬁrst diﬀerence the data.
It is less likely that yearly changes in crime lead to collective pardons.2 The second way we deal
with this endogeneity is by exploiting the national character of these pardons. Regional variation
in crime and prison population allows us to identify the incapacitation eﬀect dealing with both, the
endogeneity of the policy and the deterrence eﬀects.3
The within-year between Italian regions fraction of pardoned inmates depends on the distribution
of the residual sentence length and on the distribution of criminal types residing in a region, both
of which are plausibly exogenous. Since controlling for time ﬁxed-eﬀects leaves little variation in
our instrument, we also present estimates that control for time eﬀects using two alternative semi-
parametric speciﬁcations: a national cubic spline based on three-year intervals and a pardon speciﬁc
linear time trend.4 In these cases the identiﬁcation of the incapacitation eﬀect is based on both,
regional diﬀerences in the fraction of pardoned inmates (due to diﬀerences in the distribution of the
residual sentence length), and discontinuities in changes in crime around the collective pardons.5
Several papers have tried to estimate the eﬀect of prison population on crime, though without
separating incapacitation from deterrence. Marvell and Moody (1994) uses state-level panel data
and, after rejecting that crime Granger causes prison population, estimates an elasticity of crime
with respect to prison population of -0.16. Spelman (1994) ﬁnds similar eﬀects. Levitt (1996)
controls for the simultaneity using an IV approach and ﬁnds elasticities that are 2 to 3 times larger.
Only few papers study the eﬀect of pardons on crime. One reason for this is that most empirical
research on the criminal justice system studies the US (Levitt and Miles, 2004), and in the US
2Diﬀerencing the data is also important in case crime levels and prison population are non-stationary. A regression
in levels might then just give spurious results.
3In Levitt (1996) instead, changes in prison populations are due to overcrowding litigations carried out at the state
level. Two recent papers have been able to identify the deterrence eﬀect (Kessler and Levitt, 1999, Lee and McCrary,
2005), but to our knowledge our paper is the ﬁrst one to identify a pure incapacitation eﬀect.
4It is important to remark that including year ﬁxed eﬀects alters the signiﬁcance of the estimates, but not their
magnitude.
5Anything that evolves suﬃciently smoothly and aﬀects changes in crime rates on a national level should be
captured by our speciﬁcation for time. If, for example, pardons represent a short-term solution to jail overcrowding,
police activity, which is highly centralized in Italy, might depend on overcrowding as well.
4pardons are rare. One exception is Mocan and Gittings (2001), which estimates the deterrence eﬀect
of gubernatorial pardons of person on death row and ﬁnds that three additional pardons generate
one to 1.5 additional homicides.
In Italy, despite the recurrent use of pardons, there is only one empirical study on the relationship
between pardons and crime, carried out in 1978 (Tartaglione, 1978). This study ﬁnds that after the
1954, 1959, 1966, and 1970 pardons national changes in crime tend to be above average. The
exceptions are the 1963 one, where only one year was pardoned, and the 1969 one, which applied to
certain crimes committed during student demonstrations. It also documents that pardoned inmates
have a recidivism rate of 31.2 percent, which is not diﬀerent from s 32.9 percent, the recidivism rate
of prisoners that are released at the end of their term. Standard errors are not shown, so we don’t
know whether these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant or not. The judges who worked on this pioneering
study did not use regression methods, making it impracticable to analyze the link between prison
population and crime, or to use regional variation in the fraction of released prisoners. There is also
no attempt to value the monetary cost of the increased crime, or to separate the incapacitation eﬀect
from the total eﬀect.
Whenever the supply of criminals is inelastic, the incapacitation eﬀect is directly linked to re-
cidivism, and recidivism can also be estimated based on prisoners surveys (DiIulio and Piehl, 1991,
Peterson et al., 1980, Piehl and Diiulio Jr, 1995, Visher, 1986). According to these surveys the num-
ber of non-drug related crimes committed per year is positively skewed, with the median close to 10
and the mean close to 140. This heterogeneity and the heterogeneity in the types of crime commit-
ted generate a distribution of criminal speciﬁc social costs. Abstracting from the deterrence eﬀects,
incarceration is optimal when the expected harm done by an oﬀender in a period exceeds the per-
period cost of imprisonment (Shavell, 1987). Pardons might, therefore, act as an imperfect screening
device to free criminals whose social cost lies below the cost of incarceration, but without getting
rid of the entire deterrence eﬀect of incarceration. In spirit of this “selective incapacitation” the
penal codex establishes that pardons and amnesties (art. 151) should not be given to recidivist,
recurrent, and career criminals. Despite this law, in the 1990 and 2006 pardons and in the 1990
amnesty the legislator has decided to extend the beneﬁts to these types of criminals. Moreover, due
to the evidence that criminal activity decreases with age, the legislator has sometimes increased the
5number of pardoned years for older criminals (usually deﬁned as being older than 65 or 70 years of
age).
We ﬁnd that changes in incapacitation that are driven by collective pardons and amnesties have a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on changes in crime. Elasticities of crime with respect to prison population
lie between 0 and 49 percent, with drug crimes, frauds, and bank robberies showing the largest
responses. A preliminary cost beneﬁt analysis of pardons compared to expanding the prison capacity
seems to indicate that the latter should be preferred. Though we do believe that the cost of pardons
and amnesties could signiﬁcantly be reduced by using more selective procedures: keeping criminals
who are more likely to recommit more socially costly crimes in jail.
2 Italy’s General Collective Pardons and the Prison Popu-
lation
Starting in 1992, collective amnesties and pardons are issued by the legislator with an absolute
majority requirement of 2/3 (constitutional law n.6 of 1992). Before that year the President could
issue them, but only after being mandated by the parliament with a simple majority requirement.
The main diﬀerence between amnesty and pardon is that amnesties eliminate both the sentence
and the crime, as if it never happened, while pardons eliminate only part of the sentence. Given
that for Italian prosecutors it is mandatory to investigate all felonies (art. 112 of the Constitution),
pardons are usually followed by amnesties.6 Otherwise, prosecutors would have to spend time and
eﬀort investigating pardoned crimes, even if it was impossible to actually punish the perpetrators.
Another diﬀerence between the two is that whenever the pardoned prisoner recommits a crime within
ﬁve years, the commuted prison term gets added to the new term. Amnesties, instead, are permanent.
Both, pardons and amnesties have the eﬀect of reducing the prison population.7 8 Pardons and
amnesties reduce also the number of arrestees who are subject to restrictive measures that are diﬀerent
6The 2006 pardon has been an exception to this rule.
7The Italian Statistical Oﬃce (ISTAT) groups together pardoned and amnestied prisoners.
8The grand majority of pardoned prisoners are convicted criminals, though some might be in preventive detention
with an expected sentence that is below the maximum number of pardoned years. In 2006, for example, where the
number of pardoned years was 3, 10.7 percent of the prisoners that have been freed were in preventive detention
(Marietti, 2006).
6from imprisonment, namely social work outside prison, semiliberty, and house arrest. Between 1975,
the year in which these measures have been introduced in Italy, and 1995, 19 percent of apprehended
criminals (or alleged criminals) were subject to these alternative measures. It has been shown that
recidivism rates for these individuals are signiﬁcantly lower (Santoro and Tucci, 2004), and some of
these individuals might commit crimes even while subject to these alternative measures. Nevertheless,
changes in crime might in part be due to these additional pardoned individuals. Between WWI and
today there have been more than a dozen pardons (mostly coupled with amnesties), and while they
were mainly aimed at reconciling a politically divided nation, in more recent times their main goal is to
reduce prison overcrowding. Figure 1 shows that the oﬃcial prison capacity (measured as the number
of beds per 100,000 residents) has been declining between 1960 and 1975, signiﬁcantly reducing the
cushion between the total prison population and the total capacity. Although 81 new prisons have
been build between 1971 and 2003, during the same period 87 of them have been dismissed because
obsolete (de Franciscis, 2003). As a result between 1975 and 1991 prison capacity has been basically
ﬂat at almost 50 beds per 100,000 residents. Only in more recent times has capacity increased.
As a result of ﬂat capacity and a steady increase in crime, in 1983 time prison population exceeds
for the ﬁrst time the “oﬃcial” capacity, even if aggregated at the national level.9 The 1986 pardon
has been the ﬁrst one to solve a dramatic situation of overcrowding. Partly because of the tougher
majority requirements, 16 years have passed between the last pardon, in 2006, and the pardon before
that. During the same period the prison population has triplicated from about 20,000 to 60,000,
dropping to about 35,000 after the last pardon.10
Figure 2 shows the log changes in prison population and the fraction of pardoned prisoners. It is
evident that collective pardons induce an almost one for one change in prison population. Overall the
fraction of inmates that gets freed can be as high as 35 percent, and reaches sometimes 80 percent
in single regions. But the eﬀect appears to be short-lived. Within one year the inmate population
recovers more than half of the size of the initial jump. Between 1959 and 1995 the inmate population
increased on average by 449 inmates per year. Excluding the year of the pardons, year in which the
inmate population decreases on average by 3,700 inmates, the year immediately after the pardon the
9In case of necessity the prison administration can add new beds to existing cells, which lead them the deﬁnition
of “tolerable” capacity. Unfortunately there are no data on capacity based on this deﬁnition.
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Figure 1: End of the year prison population, prison capacity, and the total number of crimes (per
100,000 residents)
average increase is by 2,944 inmates, compared to only 1,165 in all other years. In other words, in
the year following the pardons, and excluding the year of the pardon, the inmate population grows
three times faster.
As for how these pardons aﬀect crime, ideally one would compare monthly crime level statistics
with the number of pardoned criminals. Unfortunately the only data of this kind that is available
to us are for bank robberies, and only with respect to the July 2006 pardon. Figure 3 shows the
number of bank robberies per 100 banks between January 2004 and December 2006. The vertical line
represents the month where the prison population has dropped from 60.710 to 38.847 (-36 percent).
During the same month the number of bank robberies double (p−value = 0.004), which corresponds
to an elasticity of more than one. Such a large elasticity might in part be explained if potential
bank robbers are overly represented among the pardoned prison population. Since the number of
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Figure 2: Fraction of pardoned inmates and change in inmate population
increase is due to an implicit coordination. Liquidity constrained criminals might start robbing bank
immediately after being freed, and slow down their criminal activity later on.
The next section presents the other crime data that is used to measure how other types of crime
respond to collective pardons and amnesties, this time those that have been passed between 1962
and 1995. We have chosen to collect information on crime and prison population up to 1995, because
1990 represents the last year in which a pardon gets passed for which these data are available.
2.1 Data
The Italian statistical oﬃce (ISTAT) publishes a yearly statistical supplement about the Italian
judiciary system. From these supplements we collected information about the evolution of the prison
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Figure 3: Bank robberies per 100 banks.
crime statistics, those collected directly by the police corps (Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri and Guardia
di Finanza) from people’s complaints (Le Statistiche della Delittuosita’), and those collected by the
judiciary system (Le Statistiche della Criminalita’) when the penal prosecution, which in Italy is
mandatory, starts. The two statistics diﬀer if the judiciary activity is delayed with respect to the
time the crime has been committed, and every time crimes are reported to public oﬃcials who do
not belong to the just cited police corps. Since the exact timing of our statistic is important in most
of our analysis we use crime as measured by the police. When single crime categories are unavailable
in the police data, and as a robustness check, we also use the judiciary statistics.11
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variable that we use. Between 1962 and 1995 there
11In 1984 ISTAT changed the categorization of crimes in the police statistics, providing a more detailed crime
categorization. On the other hand, judiciary data we can use a sample on single crime categories that starts from
1970 (Marselli and Vannini, 1997).
10were an average of 42 inmates per 100,000 residents. During a similar time frame Levitt (1996) shows
that in the US the inmate population is 168, exactly 4 times as large as in Italy. The total amount
of crimes per year per 100,000 residents is 1,983. This number is signiﬁcantly smaller then Levitt’s
number for the US (approximately 5,000), even though, unlike in our data, his classiﬁcation scheme is
hierarchical, it counts multiple-oﬀense events as one, the most severe, criminal event. In 1984 ISTAT
started separating reported crimes into more speciﬁc categories. Some categories are identical to
the ones reported by Levitt, and allow a comparison between Italy and the US. Burglaries are less
frequent in Italy (270 versus 1,200), and so are larcenies (200 versus 2700), though the deﬁnition and
level of reporting of these crimes might diﬀer as well. For motor vehicle thefts, where the deﬁnition is
clear, and where underreporting and multiple oﬀenses are less frequent, the two countries are similar:
317 per 100,000 residents in Italy and 402 in the US.
3 The Estimated Incapacitation Eﬀect
3.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy
We instrument changes in prison population with the number of pardoned prisoners to solve the
simultaneity problem between prison population and crime. As said, crime might respond positively
to expected future pardons (deterrence eﬀect), as well as to past and current pardons (incapacitation
eﬀect). Criminals might change their criminal activity depending on whether they believe that a
pardon is going to be issued in the near future. Fortunately, whenever pardons get enacted they
only apply to crimes committed up to a speciﬁc date, usually three to six months before the signing
of the law. The risk of committing a crime that is too close to a pardon, and is therefore excluded
from the pardon, is likely to signiﬁcantly reduce the incentive to commit pardonable crimes shortly
before the law passes.
In order to isolate the incapacitation eﬀect we need to realize that in Italy pardons are nationwide
policies, and that the deterrence eﬀect is, therefore, unlikely to vary across regions. A simple model
can be used to formalize this intuition, and to lead to our empirical speciﬁcation. Suppose criminal i
at time t (the mass of criminals is normalized to one by dividing the number criminals by the regional
11population), ex-ante identical to all other criminals, faces the following problem
maxE[ri,t − pt,rJ(St)|It]Ci,t, (1)
where the return from crime ri,t is, for simplicity, uniformly distributed between 0 and R, the joint
probability of apprehension and conviction varies across regions, and the distribution of the disutility
from jail J(St) depends on the expected sentence length, conditional on the information available up
to time t, including information about possible future pardons.
Diﬀerences in the probability of apprehension and conviction are assumed to be temporary with
mean E[pt,r] = pt. Later in the empirical speciﬁcation we deal with possible systematic diﬀerences
by controlling for proxies of p, by diﬀerencing the data, and by controlling for regional ﬁxed eﬀects.
Information I does not vary across regions. The criminal is going to commit a crime if ri,t >
ptE[J(St)|It] = ptJt
In the simpliﬁed case of a sentence length of one year the law of motion of criminals is
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.
It is possible to relax, in a reduced form approach, the assumption that sentence length S = 1.
If sentence length S is equal to two the model becomes
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Generalizing to sentence lengths up to duration Smax:












12Now let us introduce a pardon. The eﬀect of pardoning Z years is to free Wt,r criminals at the
beginning of period t, 1 −
pt ˜ Jt
R of which are going to recommit crimes during the year:













We allow the pardon to have an eﬀect on future expected sentence lengths ˜ Jt. The diﬀerence
between the scenario with and without a pardon is going to be














































Notice that the number of criminals in a region varies because of the incapacitation eﬀect (which
varies because of diﬀerences in the actual realizations of p), and because of the deterrence eﬀect.




R whenever the expected sentence





We do not observe the counterfactual criminal scenario of a “pardon–year” without a pardon.
What we do in our empirical speciﬁcation is to proxy for the counterfactual of crime using years that
are contiguous to the pardon. If regional eﬀects, time eﬀects, and time-varying variables capture
changes in the deterrence eﬀect, then the coeﬃcient on the number of pardoned prisoners captures
the incapacitation eﬀect 1 −
pt ˜ Jt
R .
Including year ﬁxed eﬀects the exogenous variation in the prison population that we exploit is
the variation in the fraction of prisoners that are pardoned across regions at a given point in time.
This fraction depends on the distribution of the residual prison time of the inmate population, which
at the time of the pardon is arguably exogenous.1213
12Kuziemko (2006) uses a similar variation to estimate the eﬀect of time served on recidivism.
13The link between regional prison population and regional crime depends crucially on the law that establishes
that arrested criminals have to be incarcerated in prisons that are located inside the competent judiciary jurisdiction,
13Unfortunately, as will be clear once we show the ﬁrst stages of our IV strategy not much variation
in the number or the fraction of pardoned prisoners is left after controlling for year ﬁxed eﬀects. In
order to approximate the evolution of the criminals’ expectations without giving up all the national
variation in pardoned prisoners we pursue two diﬀerent solutions. In one speciﬁcation we control
for a cubic spline using three-year intervals, in the other we control for pardon-speciﬁc linear time
trends. When we use splines we assume that criminals’ changes in expectations evolve smoothly,
without discontinuities. This might be either because the time constraints of the pardons eﬀectively
limit such discontinuities or because criminals simply do not take the pardon’s timing into account.
Notice that the identiﬁcation strategy is quite similar to a regression discontinuity approach. When
we use pardon-speciﬁc linear trends we assume that criminals’ expectations jump to a new level in
the year of the pardon, but evolve linearly afterwards.
The diﬀerent time controls are shown in Figure 3.1. The dotted line represents the year ﬁxed
eﬀects, meaning the regional average, of the log-change in total number of crimes. Log-changes in
crime are smoother when we use the three-year cubic spline (solid line), especially during the 80s
and 90s. The pardon-speciﬁc linear time trends on the other hand (dashed line) are close to the
ﬁxed eﬀects during the 60s (it is the decade with the highest number of pardons). Figure 3.1 shows
the same semi-parametric approximations, but this time looking at changes in levels. The cyclical
variation in crime (and log-crime), we will see, can in part be ascribed to the cyclical use pardons.
Notice that variations in logs are more or less constant over time while variations in levels are
increasing. This is due to the impressive increase in the total number of reported crimes (Figure 1).
Table 3 shows the fraction of pardoned inmates across regions. In 1963, year of the ﬁrst pardon
in our sample, in most regions only 20 percent of the prison population is pardoned. Table 4 shows
that this corresponds to approximately 10 prisoners per 100,000 residents. Only three years later, in
1966, a new pardon gets passed that frees three times as many inmates. In the Abruzzo and Molise
regions, aggregated because of data limitations, 85 percent of the inmate populations leaves jail.
The 1968 pardon instead, which applies to crimes committed during student demonstrations, only a
“Competenza per Territorio, Article 8 of the Codice di Procedura Penale” (where the crime has been committed).
Each region has one or more jurisdiction, with the exception of the Valle D’Aosta and Piedmont region who share the
jurisdiction of Torino. In the analysis that follows were are implicitly assuming that criminals operate always inside
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Figure 4: Log-change in the total number of crimes
negligible fraction of inmates gets pardoned. Two years later, due to a very large collective pardon,
in ﬁve regions, namely Abruzzo, Molise, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Trentino Alto Adige more
than 70 percent of prisoners are freed. At the end the 70s and in the 80s there are three pardons,
the ﬁrst is quite large (around 40 percent of the prison population gets freed), while the other two
are moderately sized (around 25 percent gets freed). The last pardon in our sample happens in 1990,
and the reason is that the data about the 2006 pardon are not available yet.14
When we analyze the eﬀect of the prison population on total crime, we use both a model in levels
14A special event has taken place in Italy in July 1990, the soccer world cup. In the 12 regions that hosted at least a
game log changes in crime are, compared to the remaining regions, 12 percentage points larger in 1990 than in either
1989 or 1991 (p-value of 8 percent). Prisoner ﬂows, instead, do not seem to diﬀer signiﬁcantly because of the world
cup. In order to control for changes in crime that are due to the world cup all regressions control for whether in 1990
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Figure 5: Change in the total number of crimes
and one in logs,
∆[log]CRIMEt,r = β∆[log]PRISONt,r + f(t) + δ
′Xt,r + γr + ǫt,r. (3)
All regressions include regional ﬁxed eﬀects γr, allowing for regional diﬀerences in systematic changes
in the probability of apprehension and conviction, systematic changes in the labor market, etc. The
variables are already diﬀerenced (which controls for systematic diﬀerences in the levels) and expressed
in terms of 100,000 residents. Changes in prison population are instrumented using the number of
pardoned prisoners, while log changes in prison population are instrumented using the number of
pardoned prisoners over the number of prisoners in the preceding year.
16Notice that the IV’s reduced form equation in levels,
∆CRIMEt,r = βPARDONEDt,r + f(t) + δ
′Xt,r + γr + ǫt,r. (4)
is directly related to equation 2. The term f(t) + γr + δ′Xt,r is supposed to capture the deterrence
eﬀect and isolate the incapacitation eﬀect β = 1 −
pt ˜ Jt
R . Not controlling for the deterrence eﬀect
could bias the estimated incapacitation eﬀect downward. The reason is that post–pardon increases
in expected sentence lengths are likely to reduce crime (it is optimal to increase criminal activity
before the pardon and reduce it afterwards).
Given that some released prisoners get rearrested within a year, we would like to estimate how
crime rates vary immediately after a pardon gets enacted. But pardons and amnesties are sometimes
passed in the middle of the year, and we have no access to monthly regional data. Fortunately we can
use the date the pardon gets passed to adjust the change in the prison population and the number
of pardoned prisoners to produce “full-year equivalent” pardoned prisoners, that is prisoners who
can potentially commit crimes for a whole year. Take, for example, the 1978 pardon. The law was
issued on the 5th of August. Assuming that criminal activity is uniformly distributed over time after
the pardon, recidivist prisoners would be able to commit crimes for 5 months in 1978. A way to
take this timing into account and produce “full-year equivalent” prisoners is to reduce the number
of pardoned prisoners by 7/12 in the year of the pardon and add these prisoners to the year after
the pardon, year in which they can potentially commit crimes for the whole year.15















15In 1990, the amnesty was done in April, while the pardon was done in December. As a result the weight is going
to be the average of the two periods weighted by what fraction of released prisoners got released because of the pardon
(80 percent) and the amnesty (20 percent) (Censis, 2006).




in all other years. We also adjust the prison population accordingly.
3.2 Results
Panel A of Table 5 reports the ﬁrst stage estimates of the change in prison population on the number
of pardoned prisoners. In column 1, where f(t) is estimated using a three-year cubic spline the ﬁrst
stage tells us that by the end of the year each pardoned prisoner reduces the prison population by
0.46. Once we control for year ﬁxed eﬀects (column 3) the coeﬃcient drops to -0.11, demonstrating
that the instrument becomes weaker once we absorb the nation-wide variation in the number of
pardoned prisoners.
Panel B shows the ﬁrst stage regression when log-changes are used instead of changes in levels.
In Panel C (D) instead the dependent variable is changes in crime (log-changes in crime). Let
us immediately say that because of the simultaneity between crime and prison population OLS
estimates are biased toward zero. In the years after pardons get passed high incarceration rates
match high crime rates, introducing a positive correlation. The IV estimates tell us that for each
pardoned prisoner the estimated number of crimes increases by between 30.85 if we use cubic splines
to approximate f(t) and by 44.48 crimes if we use pardon-speciﬁc linear time trends to approximate
f(t). This diﬀerence is mainly driven by the diﬀerence in the ﬁrst stage estimates. The reduced
form coeﬃcients are not very diﬀerent, 14.34 versus 17.80. Notice that both estimates are highly
signiﬁcant. The model in logs shows elasticities of 17 percent for the model with splines and 19
percent for the model with pardon-speciﬁc linear time trends. It is comforting that the IV estimates
that include year ﬁxed eﬀects are, although not precisely estimated, similar to the IV estimates that
use pardon-speciﬁc linear trends, both in levels and in logs.
In Table 5 we additionally control for things that might aﬀect pardons and crime rates. From now
on we control for our preferred (and the more conservative) speciﬁcation, the one that uses three-year
cubic splines. Since some of the additional controls are available for the years 1985-1995 only, the
18sample size drops from 594 to 198. Changes in GDP are supposed to proxy for legal opportunities of
criminals while changes in consumption are supposed to capture illegal opportunities. Controlling for
these opportunities changes the reduced form elasticity (Table 5) from 32 percent to 28 percent, while
the IV elasticity remains almost identical (27 versus 24 percent). Despite the smaller sample size
the estimates are precisely measured and are larger than the elasticities estimated before, indicating
that the incapacitation has increased over time.
Police enforcement might strategically respond to the legislator’s pardons. Depending on their
objective function police oﬃcers might either increase or decrease their eﬀorts to apprehend criminals.
The supply shock of criminals after a pardon is likely to increase the probability of apprehension (p)
and also police activity (A) if their goal is to equate expected marginal beneﬁts pB(A) to marginal
costs C(A) and BAA < 0, CAA > 0. On the other hand, pardons are likely to weaken the police
oﬃcers motivations, and, therefore, productivity. Pardons do not only waste part of their past eﬀorts.
Criminals who commit a crime before the pardon, but get arrested only after the pardon, can also
beneﬁt from the pardon. This means that even post–pardon arrests might end up being of little use.
For these reasons in Columns 3 and 7 we control for changes in the number of police oﬃcers and for
changes in the number of controlled people. Both, the reduced form estimate and the IV estimates
are robust to this inclusion, indicating, at least, that police activity does not change as abruptly as
the inmate population.
Finally, we control for changes in the fraction of inmates staying in dormitories and for the
change in the rate of overcrowding (inmates divided by available beds). The reason is that changes
in prison quality might have a deterrence eﬀect (Katz et al., 2003). Although the change in the
rate of overcrowding captures part of the variability that is due to the pardons, there are again no
signiﬁcant changes in either the marginal eﬀects or the elasticities of interest, which suggests that
pardons can be credibly treated as exogenous and that there is no need to control for other variables.
Not all criminals are usually pardoned, usually some restrictions apply. Very violent crimes are
generally excluded from pardons (see Table 1). Consistent with this selection, in Table 7 we ﬁnd
that between 1984 and 1995 types of crime that are explicitly excluded from pardons, like sexual
assaults and kidnappings, do not show any signiﬁcant increase related to pardons.16 It is somehow
16Maﬁa related homicides, always excluded from pardons, also do not respond to pardons. Since many regions have
19puzzling that larcenies and burglaries have an eﬀect that is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
though these crimes might be subject in the police data to serious measurement error. Motor-vehicle
thefts, instead, that are known to be measured with high precision (the rates of reporting are close
to one), have an elasticity of 20 percent. Bank robberies show an elasticity of 50 percent, and drug
related crimes an elasticity of 60 percent, even if these were explicitly excluded from the 1990 pardon
(though not from the 1990 amnesty).
As an additional robustness check, Table 8 shows that using judiciary crime data instead of police
data only strengthen the incapacitation eﬀect (30 percent versus 22 percent). Given that “judges for
the initial investigation” (giudice delle indagini preliminari) are supposed to dismiss all irrelevant
cases before reporting a crime, this might be due to the gained precision in the measurement of crime.
Consistent with this possibility, the elasticity for thefts, which includes larceny and burglary, is now
close to 40 percent and highly signiﬁcant. Frauds show the highest elasticity (49 percent) and even
the coeﬃcient for murder and attempted murder is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (36 percent).
4 Policy Implications
In order to solve the problem of prison overcrowding, the important question is whether a forward-
looking society would beneﬁt from building new prisons, or expand alternative measures to impris-
onment, instead of constantly relying on pardons. Collective pardons and collective amnesties have
been shown to increase the total number of crimes. What is left to see is whether the marginal social
cost of these crimes is, when compared to the marginal cost of incarceration, large enough to make
pardons an ineﬃcient policy.
Let us start with the cost of incarceration.17 Regressing the total budgetary cost of the peniten-
tiary administration (in 2004 euros) on prison population over the last 17 years we obtain a marginal
cost per prisoners equal to 42,449 euros (95 percent conﬁdence interval [11,066-73,832]) when we
use OLS and equal to 57,830 euros (95 percent conﬁdence interval [44,092 71,568]) when we use a
no maﬁa related homicides we analyzed changes in levels. Results are available upon request.
17Notice that we are implicitly assuming a linear social function. In case of risk aversion individuals would like to
equate marginal expected (dis)utility from crime with their marginal tax devoted to ﬁnance the prison administration.
Given that crime involves risk, people should be willing to pay even more than the marginal cost of incarceration to
keep criminals in jail.
20median regression. Dividing the budget by the prison population instead, we get an average cost of
46,452 euros with a range that varies between 35,496 euros (97 euros per day) and 70,974 (194 euros
per day). Overall the upper bar seems to be 70,000 euros. These numbers are two to three times
larger than in the US, though this seems to be driven by the inmate-to-staﬀ ratio, that is two to six
times larger than in the US states.18 Notice that these costs do not include tax distortions (it costs
more than one euro to collect one euro in taxes), inmates’ wasted human capital, their post-release
decline in wages, and the pain and suﬀering of inmates and of their families (including the one due
to overcrowding).
Calculating the marginal cost per crime is more diﬃcult and requires the use of diﬀerent sources
and several assumptions. Table 9 reports the estimated elasticity (ǫ), the probability of reporting
(p), the marginal eﬀect of incarceration (β = ǫ
p × crimes
prison−pop), the cost per crime (c), and the social
cost (s = β × c).19
All but two cost per crime estimates and the probabilities of reporting a crime come from ISTAT’s
2002 victimization study (Muratore et al., 2004). Italy’s Value of a Statistical Life (VSL), used to
value a lost life due to intentional homicide, has been estimated in a study commissioned by the
European Commission (Albertini and Scarpa, 2004) and its results are comparable to several other
studies done in the US.20 The social cost of frauds comes from a study made by the Italian association
of retailers (Con, 2006).2122 For drug related crimes we could not ﬁnd any cost estimate, while for
attempted murder, which also has a positive elasticity we use a conservative estimate of 0. Notice that
when computing the total social cost, question marks are treated as zeros, a conservative approach.
For violent crimes we do not use quality of life reductions caused by pain and suﬀering, because no
such estimates are available for Italy. The cost estimates also do not include preventive measures
18At the beginning of 2007 the Italian prison system employed more than 45,000 people, with an inmate-to-staﬀ
ratio close to one (www.polizia-penitenziaria.it). In 2001 in the US the inmate-to-staﬀ ratio ranged between 1.7 in
Maine (with an average cost of 122 dollars per day) and 6.8 in Alabama (with an average cost of 22 dollars per day ,
www.ojp.usdoj.gov).
19As in Levitt (1996) we need to assume that reported and unreported crimes are subject to the same elasticities,
which, since criminals do not know a priori whether a crime gets reported or not, seems to be a reasonable assumption.
20Estimates of the VSL for Italy range from 1,448,000 to 2,896,000 euros (Albertini and Scarpa, 2004). See
Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004b) and Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004a) for an overview of recent estimates of
the VSL.
21The study uses the following sources for its estimate, ﬁscal police (Guardia di Finanza), customs police (Agenzia
delle Dogane), survey data, and the anti-fraud phone (Telefono antiplagio).
22We could not estimate some elasticities, marked with a question mark, while for other elasticities, based on
institutional details of the pardons, we have a conservative guess of zero, marked with a zero and a question mark.
21taken by people to ﬁght crime (insurance policies and the like). Apprehensions are also socially costly,
because resources must be spent to rearrest pardoned prisoners, but since these costs are diﬃcult to
be quantiﬁed they also are excluded.
Taken with the grain of salt given the assumptions, the total social cost amounts to 153,000
euros. The most socially costly crimes following a pardon are frauds (55,000 euros) and non-maﬁa
related murders (46,000 euros). Motor vehicle thefts (a total of 31,000 euros), other thefts (14,000
euros) and bank robberies (8,000 euros) follow. This variability suggests that pardons do not select
the type of criminals that are being released based on a cost minimizing principle.23 Even if we
exclude the social cost that is related to frauds, which is the only one that is not entirely based on
representative victimization surveys or on police reports, the social cost is still signiﬁcantly above
the 70,000 threshold.
Up until now we have excluded pardoned individuals who are subject to alternative measures to
detention from the cost beneﬁt analysis. The reason is that we do not have region–level data on these
measures. We do know, though that pardons aﬀect the prison population and the population subject
to alternative measures of detention in the same way. Since the population subject to alternative
measures of detention is likely to recidivate less and cost less than the prison population, including
them in the cost-beneﬁt analysis is likely to reduce the marginal cost of imprisonment, making the
case against pardons and amnesties even stronger.
5 Conclusions
We use an atypical judiciary policy, namely Italy’s collective pardons and amnesties, to estimate the
causal eﬀect of incapacitation on crime. We show with a simple model that whenever pardons and
amnesties are nationwide policies the incapacitation can be separately identiﬁed from the deterrence
eﬀect. We can also control for the possible endogeneity of the policy that arises whenever criminals
expect a sentence-reducing policy before the policy gets enacted. Ignoring this endogeneity could
23While some of these cost are simple transfers to criminals, we believe that from a political economy point of view,
it is correct to exclude criminals’ utility from the beneﬁt estimates. Arrested criminals are typically not allowed to
vote, and even if they were, given our estimates, median voters would decide to build new prisons, or use policies
(typically active labor market policies) that would create incentives for pardoned prisoners to avoid recommitting
crimes. This last policy implication, though, would only hold if pardons had no real detrimental deterrence eﬀect,
which is still an open question, and needs further research.
22bias our estimates toward zero. Compared to Levitt (1996), which uses US States’ overcrowding
litigation status as an instrument and, therefore, is unable to control for expectations, or separate
incapacitation from deterrence, our elasticities are only slightly smaller, and tend to be larger than
previous “non-experimental” estimates (we show that our OLS estimates are also biased toward
zero).
Collective pardons and amnesties could represent a more cost-eﬃcient imperfect screening device
than individual parole boards. This idea was certainly present in the mind of the legislator (at least
before the 1990 pardon). “Formalized” habitual criminals were typically excluded from pardons,
and elderly prisoners, believed to have lower recidivism rates, sometimes received larger sentence
reductions.
This view could potentially lead to the deﬁnition of an optimal release policy, likely to be several
times more eﬃcient than the typical Italian pardon. We leave this to future research, and perform
a cost-beneﬁt analysis that compares the eﬃciency of pardons with the the status quo, i.e. keeping
prisoners in jail. We ﬁnd the social cost of pardons to be signiﬁcantly larger than the cost of
incarceration. In the absence of cost eﬃcient alternatives measures to incarceration, this suggests
that in Italy prison capacity should be increased.
23A Deﬁnitions of crime, years available, and source
Maﬁa murders, 1984-95, police records Intentional homicides related to the organized crime
Sexual assaults, 1984-95, police records The carnal knowledge against someone’s will
Kidnappings, 1984-95, police records
Drug related crimes, 1984-95, police records
Larcenies, 1984-95, police records The unlawful taking of property from the possession of an-
other
Burglaries, 1984-95, police records The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a theft.
Motor vehicle theft, 1984-95, police records
Bank robberies, 1984-95, police records The seizing property from a bank through violence or
intimidation.
Theft and aggravated thefts, 1970-1995, judiciary records
Homicides, 1970-1995, judiciary records
Frauds, 1970-1995, judiciary records The deceiving of someone to damage him usually, to ob-
tain property or services unjustly. Examples are false advertising, identity theft, false billing,
forgery of documents or signatures, false insurance claims, investment frauds, etc.
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27Table 1: History of collective pardons from 1978 to 2006.
LAW EFFECTIVE TYPE N. OF YEARS
PARDONED
INCLUDED CRIMES EXCLUDED CRIMES EXCLUDED CRIMINALS
Jan 24, 1963 (Dec
8, 1962)
Amnesty 3 years (4 years if
the inmate’s age is
below 18).
Thefts of plants, crimes related to art.
82 of the penal codex (p.c.).
I(371); III(444); IV(516); V(528, 530). Criminals who at the amnesty have been sen-
tenced to more than 1 year for intentional
crimes.
Pardon 1 year (2 years if
the inmate’s age is
below 18 or above
70).
I(314, 315, 317); III(439, 440, 441); V(519, 520);
VIII(628).
Criminals who at the amnesty have been sen-
tenced to more than 1 year for intentional
crimes.
June 4, 1966 (Jan
31, 1966)
Amnesty 3 years (4 years if
the inmate’s age is
below 18 or above
70).
Tax crimes, thefts of plants, wood and
ﬁsh, crimes related to art. 57, 82, 330,
337, 340, 341, 414, 415, 507, 508, 610,
635 of the p.c.; crimes related to the
Resistance Movement if committed be-
tween July 25, 1943 and June 2, 1946.
I(316, 318-322, 371); III(443-447); V(528, 530). Criminals who at the amnesty have been sen-
tenced to more than 2 years for intentional
crimes.
Pardon 2 years. Tax crimes, crimes concerning the law
of customs and monopoly.
Professional or recurrent criminals.
Oct 25, 1968 (June
27, 1968)
Amnesty 5 years. Crimes committed because of, and dur-
ing political demonstrations related to
art. 338, 419, 423 of the p.c., crimes
related to Vajont disaster.
Criminals who at the amnesty have been sen-
tenced to more than 3 years for intentional
crimes.
Pardon 2 years. Same as above, and crimes related to
Vajont disaster.
Professional or recurrent criminals.
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5 years. Crimes related to art. 302, 303, 338,
419, 423 of the p.c., illegal detention
of arms, crimes concerning the law of
customs, crimes related with tobacco
monopoly.
Amnesty 3 years (4 years if
the inmate’s age is
below 18 or above
70).
Non-ﬁnancial crimes, thefts and crimes
related to art. 314 of the penal codex
(p. c.).
I(371, 372, 388); III(443, 444, 446, 447); V(528, 530). Professional or recurrent criminals, criminals
who at the amnesty have been sentenced to
more than 3 years for intentional crimes.
Pardon 2 years. Crimes covered by the military penal
codex (m.p.c.) if committed because of
conscientious objection.
Professional or recurrent criminals, criminals
who at the amnesty have been sentenced to
more than 3 years for intentional crimes.
Aug 5, 1978 (March
15, 1978)
Amnesty 3 years (4 years if
the inmate’s age is
below 18 or above
70).
Non-ﬁnancial crimes with few excep-
tions, crimes related to art. 57 and 334
of the p. c., and WWII desertions.
I (316, 318-321, 355, 371, 372, 385, 391); III (443-445);
IV (501, 501-bis); VII (590); VIII (644). Art. 218 of the
m. p. c.. Crimes associated with construction (several
laws (s. l.)), environment (s. l.), illegion detention of
arms(s. l.), and currency(s. l.).
Professional or recurrent criminals, criminals
who within 5 years preceding the amnesty
have been sentenced to more than 2 years for
intentional crimes, criminals who have been
sentenced to more than 10 years for inten-
tional crimes.
Pardon 1 year for crimes re-
lated to art. 441,
442, 519, 521, 624
of the p.c.; other-
wise 2 years.
I (253, 276, 283-286, 306, 314, 315, 317, 319, 385); III
(422, 428 - 434, 438 - 440); VII (575); VIII (628 - 630).
Crimes associated with reorganization of fascism (law),
drugs (law), currency (s. l.), production and trade of
arms (s. l.), and ﬁnancial crimes.
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PARDONED
INCLUDED CRIMES EXCLUDED CRIMES EXCLUDED CRIMINALS
Dec 19, 1981 (Aug
31, 1981)
Amnesty 3 years (4 years if
the inmate’s age is
below 18 or above
70).
Non-ﬁnancial crimes with few excep-
tions, crimes related to art. 57, 334,
476, 491, 482 and 610 of the p. c.
I (316, 318-321, 355, 371, 372, 385, 391); III (443-445);
IV (501, 501-bis); VII (590); VIII (644). Art. 218 of
the m. p. c.. Crimes associated with construction (s.
l.), environment (s.l.), illegal detention of arms (s.l.),
currency (s.l.) and terrorism.
Professional or recurrent criminals, criminals
who within 5 years preceding the amnesty
have been sentenced to more than 2 years for
intentional crimes, criminals who have been
sentenced to more than 10 years for inten-
tional crimes.
Pardon 1 year for crimes re-
lated to art. 441,
442, 519, 521, 624
of the p.c.; other-
wise 2 years.
I (253, 270, 270-bis, 276, 280, 283-286, 289-bis, 306,
314, 315, 317, 319, 385); II (420); III (422, 428 - 434,
438 - 440); VII (575); VIII (628 - 630, 648 - bis). Crimes
associated with reorganization of fascism (s. l.), drugs
(law), currency (s. l.), production and trade of arms
(s. l.), terrorism, and ﬁnancial crimes.
Professional or recurrent criminals.
Dec 16, 1986 (June
8, 1986)
Amnesty 3 years (4 years if
the inmate’s age is
below 18 or above
65).
Non-ﬁnancial crimes with few excep-
tions, crimes related to art. 57, 476,
491, 482, 337 and 610 of the p. c., il-
legal detention of small weapons (s.l.),
crimes committed by criminals under
age 18
I (316, 318-321, 355, 371, 372, 385, 391); III (443-445);
IV (501, 501-bis); VII (590); VIII (644). Crimes as-
sociated with construction (s. l.), environment (s. l.),
modiﬁcation of weapons (law) and currency (s. l.). pro-
tection of Venice (s. l.), ecological crimes (s. l.)
Professional or recurrent criminals, criminals
who within 10 years preceding the amnesty
have been sentenced to more than 3 years for
intentional crimes.
Pardon 1 year for crimes re-
lated to art. 441,
442, 519, 521, 624
of the p.c.; 3 years
if the inmte’s age is
above 65; otherwise
2 years.
I (253, 270, 270-bis, 276, 280, 283-286, 289, 289-bis,
306, 314, 315, 317, 319, 385); II (416 - bis, 420); III
(422, 428 - 434, 438 - 442); V (519, 521); VII (575);
VIII (628 - 630, 648 - bis). Art. 167, 186, 195, 215,
216, 217 of the m. p. c.. Crimes associated with the
reorganization of fascism (s. l.), drugs (s. l.), currency
(s. l.), secret organizations (s. l.), illegal detention of
arms (law), and ﬁnancial crimes.
Professional or recurrent criminals.
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0LAW EFFECTIVE TYPE N. OF YEARS
PARDONED
INCLUDED CRIMES EXCLUDED CRIMES EXCLUDED CRIMINALS
April 12, 1990 (Oct
24, 1989)
Amnesty 4 years. Non-ﬁnancial crimes with few excep-
tions, crimes related to art. 57, 336,
337, 588, 614, 640, of the p. c., ille-
gal detention of arms (s. l.), crimes
related to strikes (s. l.), crimes com-
mitted by criminals under age 18 (s.l.),
crimes related to tobacco monopoly,
crimes related to taxes on consump-
tion of gas and electricity (s.l.), small
crimes related to taxes committed by
non-commercial entities.
I (316, 318-321, 353-355, 371, 372, 378, 385, 391);
II(420); III (443-445, 452, 471, 478); IV (501, 501-bis);
V(521); VII (590, 595, 610); VIII (644); IX (733, 734).
Crimes associated with construction (s. l.), environ-
ment (s. l.), control of arms (law), maﬁa (law), pro-
tection of Venice (s. l.), risks of big accidents associ-
ated with certain industrial activities (law), ecological
crimes (s.l.) and modiﬁcation of artworks (law).
NO
Dec 24, 1990 (Oct
24, 1989)
Pardon 2 years. NO
July 31, 2006 (May
2, 2006)
Pardon 3 years. I (270, 270-bis, 270-quater, 270-quinquies, 280, 280-bis,
285, 289-bis, 306); II (416); III (422); VII (600, 600-bis,
600-ter, 600-quater, 600-quinquies, 601, 602, 609-bis,
609-quater, 609-quinquies, 609-octies); VIII (630, 644,
648-bis). Crimes associated with drugs.
NO
Notes:
I - Crime against the State/PA/Judiciary System; II - C.a. public order; III - Fraud; IV - C.a Economic System; V - C. a. morality; VI - C. a. family; VII - C. a. person (inc. violent crimes);
VIII - C. a. wealth (thefts etc); IX - Crimes against the State’s social activity. Article numbers reported within brackets in the column of excluded crimes are articles of the penal codex,
unless something diﬀerent is explicitly indicated. Date: Publication date is presented above the eﬀectiveness date (in brackets). The Amnesty/Pardon is valid for crimes committed before the
eﬀectiveness date.
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1Table 2: Summary statistics (per 100,000 residents when applicable)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Prison population 42.471 17.178 7.647 100.995 612
Pardoned prisoners 3.583 6.093 0 35.343 612
GDP per capita (x1000) 13.704 3.526 7.247 21.97 288
Consumption per capita (x1000) 11.219 2.032 7.299 17.728 288
# of police forces 439.404 179.88 112.951 995.681 288
# of police controls 52931.831 28147.419 0 125339.326 255
Dormitories 0.122 0.057 0 0.361 611
Inmates # of beds 0.798 0.337 0.15 2.046 611
Maﬁa murders 0.434 1.164 0 7.971 255
Sexual assault 1.364 0.631 0 3.607 255
Kidnappings 1.102 0.538 0 2.578 255
Drug related c. 42.487 30.901 0 159.845 255
Larceny 193.444 188.906 0 1073.249 255
Burglary 253.103 131.561 0 760.621 255
Motor vehicle theft 303.592 268.271 0 1174.157 255
Bank robberies 1.32 2.107 0 12.588 612
Theft and aggravated theft 2073.106 1158.944 240.299 7967.78 468
Attempted and committed intentional homicides 3.609 3.316 0.258 23.575 468
Fraud 43.9 30.424 11.609 294.63 468
Total # crimes (Police) 1983.252 1293.943 538.976 7696.002 612
Total # crimes (Judiciary) 3283.724 1547.89 794.03 11464.021 468
32Table 3: Fraction of the prison population that is pardoned.
1963 1966 1968 1970 1978 1981 1986 1990
Abruzzo & Molise 0.301 0.847 0.007 0.732 0.426 0.184 0.274 0.459
Basilicata 0.285 0.642 0.007 0.445 0.287 0.119 0.153 0.348
Calabria 0.248 0.382 0.02 0.378 0.313 0.154 0.137 0.337
Campania 0.175 0.464 0.008 0.698 0.377 0.179 0.211 0.358
Emilia Romagna 0.218 0.619 0.003 0.675 0.318 0.231 0.2 0.433
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.276 0.62 0.003 0.709 0.429 0.289 0.333 0.514
Lazio 0.204 0.427 0.036 0.319 0.307 0.212 0.144 0.276
Liguria 0.192 0.579 0.007 0.715 0.392 0.234 0.236 0.372
Lombardia 0.223 0.556 0.028 0.617 0.339 0.214 0.161 0.366
Marche 0.199 0.747 0.025 0.695 0.418 0.152 0.119 0.341
Piemonte & Valle d’Aosta 0.23 0.55 0.014 0.676 0.272 0.15 0.171 0.428
Puglia 0.216 0.512 0.005 0.508 0.397 0.246 0.277 0.401
Sardegna 0.132 0.387 0.004 0.389 0.266 0.202 0.205 0.243
Sicilia 0.192 0.447 0.007 0.497 0.369 0.199 0.103 0.419
Toscana 0.224 0.69 0.012 0.579 0.357 0.239 0.256 0.281
Trentino-Alto Adige 0.247 0.591 0.091 0.772 0.638 0.32 0.415 0.504
Umbria 0.172 0.385 0 0.573 0.425 0.205 0.47 0.316
Veneto 0.251 0.62 0.011 0.549 0.366 0.193 0.287 0.462
Table 4: Pardoned inmates per 100,000 residents.
1963 1966 1968 1970 1978 1981 1986 1990
Abruzzo & Molise 5.4 16.3 0.2 24.1 14.2 7.9 12.5 19.0
Basilicata 10.7 24.5 0.3 17.2 14.9 5.7 8.2 13.1
Calabria 12.1 15.8 0.9 14.9 13.9 7.4 8.3 12.4
Campania 11.4 28.4 0.4 35.3 18.7 6.6 14.5 15.8
Emilia Romagna 6.0 16.0 0.1 14.4 9.1 6.7 6.5 13.8
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 10.1 18.9 0.1 18.9 14.8 9.2 11.3 13.7
Lazio 8.8 19.1 1.4 11.9 15.3 13.3 9.3 12.0
Liguria 10.2 29.8 0.3 29.0 18.8 11.1 12.4 13.4
Lombardia 8.0 17.4 0.7 14.6 9.1 5.9 6.1 12.2
Marche 2.8 13.8 0.4 13.7 5.0 2.8 4.0 6.9
Piemonte & Valle d’Aosta 9.6 19.8 0.5 19.6 10.4 6.3 9.1 18.8
Puglia 10.1 20.2 0.2 18.6 18.2 12.7 12.9 14.1
Sardegna 7.0 18.7 0.2 15.5 11.8 11.3 10.7 11.5
Sicilia 13.3 29.3 0.4 24.8 22.4 11.7 7.3 19.5
Toscana 7.2 19.0 0.3 14.1 9.9 7.2 9.9 10.3
Trentino-Alto Adige 7.4 17.3 2.1 17.7 13.7 10.1 14.0 15.1
Umbria 5.7 13.0 0.0 22.0 16.6 5.4 7.3 8.5
Veneto 5.8 12.9 0.2 10.6 7.5 4.3 7.3 8.4
33Table 5: (Log-) changes in crime on (log-) changes in prison population, 1963-1995.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: ∆ prison pop. Panel B: ∆ log prison pop.
FIRST Pardoned -0.46 -0.41 -0.11 -1.18 -1.12 -0.28
STAGE prisoners (0.06)** (0.08)** (0.08) (0.13)** (0.14)** (0.12)*
R-squared 0.36 0.33 0.49 0.44 0.47 0.67
Panel C: ∆ crime Panel D: ∆ log crime
REDUCED Pardoned 14.34 17.80 4.46 0.21 0.23 0.07
FORM prisoners (2.29)** (3.97)** (6.13) (0.03)** (0.05)** (0.09)
R-squared 0.37 0.32 0.43 0.29 0.28 0.32
IV Change -30.85 -44.48 -39.71 -0.17 -0.19 -0.24
in prison pop. (5.47)** (11.18)** (58.01) (0.02)** (0.03)** (0.28)
OLS Change -4.89 -8.14 -0.36 -0.08 -0.11 0.00
in prison pop. (1.85)* (2.16)** (2.17) (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.03)
R-squared 0.29 0.25 0.43 0.19 0.19 0.32
REG FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year controls spline time trends dummies spline time trends dummies
Observations 594 594 594 594 594 594
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
34Table 6: The incapacitation elasticity after controlling for additional factors.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log-change in crime, reduced form Log-change in crime, instrumental variable
Fraction of pardoned 0.32 0.28 0.27 0.28
prisoners (adj.) (0.07)** (0.08)** (0.08)** (0.08)**
Log change in prison -0.29 -0.23 -0.23 -0.27 -0.24 -0.25 -0.22
pop. (adj.) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.05)** (0.04)**
Log change in GDP 0.67 0.26 0.34 -0.12 -0.13 -0.09
(0.70) (0.74) (0.76) (0.37) (0.38) (0.36)
Log change in consumption 1.74 1.77 1.27
(0.47)** (0.53)** (0.57)*
Log change in police oﬃcers 0.17 0.16 -0.03 0.00
(0.08)* (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Log change in number 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.00
of people controlled (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Log change in the fraction of -0.00 -0.02
inmates staying in dormitories (0.04) (0.03)
Log change in overcrowding -0.02 0.10
(0.02) (0.03)**
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198
R-squared 0.33 0.50 0.51 0.51
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
3
5Table 7: The incapacitation eﬀect for diﬀerent types of crime for the years 1985-1995.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Sex. assault Kidnapp. Drug deals Larceny Burglary MV thefts Bank rob. Total
RF IV RF IV RF IV RF IV RF IV RF IV RF IV RF IV
Panel B: Log-changes in crime
Fraction of 0.23 0.06 0.65 -0.12 0.06 0.20 0.52 0.30
pardoned pris. (0.30) (0.31) (0.07)** (0.23) (0.07) (0.08)* (0.23)* (0.09)**
Log-change in -0.22 -0.06 -0.60 0.11 -0.05 -0.18 -0.48 -0.28
prison pop. (0.26) (0.29) (0.13)** (0.20) (0.06) (0.05)** (0.24) (0.05)**
R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.44 0.07 0.13 0.44 0.14 0.50
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
3
6Table 8: The incapacitation eﬀect for diﬀerent types of crime for the years 1970-1995.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Changes in log number of :
Thefts Homicides Frauds Total crimes (judiciary) Total crimes (police)
RF IV RF IV RF IV RF IV RF IV
Frac. of par- 0.46 0.38 0.51 0.32 0.23
doned inmates (0.12)** (0.11)** (0.16)** (0.07)** (0.05)**
Log-Change -0.43 -0.36 -0.49 -0.30 -0.22
in prison pop. (0.09)** (0.14)* (0.13)** (0.06)** (0.04)**
R-squared 0.31 0.06 0.23 0.27 0.30
Observations 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 5 percent; ** signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
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7Table 9: Social beneﬁt from incarceration
Crime Total Elasticity Reporting prob. Marginal eﬀect Cost per crime Social cost
Against the person
Massacre 24 0 ? - - - -
Maﬁa related murder 299 0.00 1.00 0.00 - 0.00
non-Maﬁa related murder 1,249 0.36 1.00 0.02 2,000,000 45,411
Attempted murder 1,542 0.36 1.00 0.03 0 ? -
Infanticide 6 0 ? - - - -
Voluntary manslaughter 83 ? - - - -
Involuntary manslaughter 8,294 ? - - - -
Sexual assault 4,571 0 ? - - - -
Other (including assault, battery, pornography) 290,612 ? - - - -
Against the family, the morale, the animals
18,180 0 ? - - - -
Against property
Motor vehicle theft (motorbikes) 80,494 0.18 0.95 1.55 2,156 3,339
Motor vehicle theft (cars) 182,470 0.18 0.87 3.84 7,145 27,404
Other thefts 1,252,117 0.43 0.54 41.85 326 13,643
Bank robbery 21,033 0.48 1.00 0.38 21,033 8,043
Other robberies 34,037 0.18 0.50 1.25 326 407
Extorsion 8,024 ? - 0.15 - -
Kidnappings 196 0.00 - - - 0.00
Harm to things, animals, property, etc. 300,352 ? - - - -
Fraud 301,428 0.49 1.00 5.48 9,953 54,545
Against the economy and the public trust
Commercial fraud 8,583 0.49 1.00 0.16 ? -
Drug related crimes 33,417 0.60 1.00 0.61 ? -
Other (forged currency, counterfeit) 193,095 0.49 1.00 3.51 ? -
Against the State and the public order
74,610 0 ? - - - -
Other crimes
153,878 0 ? - - - -
Total 2,968,594 Total social cost 152,792.55
Total social cost without including frauds 98,247.09
Notes: See Section 4 for the list of sources and assumptions used.
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